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INTRODUCTION 
The Arctic Ocean is the smallest1 and least understood2 ocean in 
the world, yet it contains more than one-quarter of the earth’s entire 
continental shelf.3 In recent years, the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS” or “Convention”)4 has emerged as a 
powerful driver for acquiring scientific data about the Arctic 
continental shelf and seafloor and for encouraging new forms of 
scientific and diplomatic cooperation in the wild, pristine and 
diminishingly icy but still dangerous seascape of the Arctic Ocean.5 
This cooperation is in stark contrast to media assertions of the 
potential for conflict in the Arctic and to other speculation, often 
focusing unduly on the Russian Federation, that an unregulated race 
for the North Pole is underway.6 In fact, Russia was the first State, 
 
 1. See Michael Pidwirny, FUNDAMENTALS OF PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY (2006), 
http://www.physicalgeography.net/fundamentals/8o.html (last visited Nov. 27, 
2009) (noting that the Arctic Ocean only covers about 3% of the Earth’s surface 
area, whereas the Pacific Ocean, for example, covers about 31%); see also COMM. 
ON THE ARCTIC RESEARCH VESSEL ET AL., ARCTIC OCEAN RESEARCH AND 
SUPPORTING FACILITIES: NATIONAL NEEDS AND GOALS 7 (1995) (pointing out that, 
in spite of its small areal size, the Arctic Ocean has the world’s widest continental 
shelves, which extend up to 1,210 km from certain points off the Siberian 
coastline). 
 2. See George B. Newton, A Message From the Chair in U.S. ARCTIC 
RESEARCH COMM., REPORT ON GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR ARCTIC RESEARCH 
(2005), available at http://www.arctic.gov/publications/usarc_2005_goals.pdf 
(remarking that there has been an increased research focus on the Arctic since the 
end of the Cold War). 
 3. George B. Newton, Coming to the Arctic: Oil, Ships, and UNCLOS Plus 
Risk and Research in INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POLICY, THE ARCTIC AND THE LAW 
OF THE SEA 321, 324 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2005). 
 4. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 6, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 5. See generally Nat’l Snow & Ice Data Ctr., http://nsidc.org/arcticseaice 
news/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2009) (charting the rapid and unexpected decline in the 
extent and thickness of Arctic Sea ice which, along with other natural drivers, has 
increased access to the seafloor and resulted in an increase in the amount of 
available data pertaining to the arctic region). On the challenges and dangers posed 
by an ice-diminished Arctic Ocean, see generally ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC 
MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT 2009 REPORT (2009). 
 6. See, e.g., Arctic Thaw Presents New Chance for Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
29, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/29/world/europe/29iht-
arctic.1.19773378.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2009) (describing a gathering of 
NATO commanders and lawmakers in Reykjavik, Iceland to discuss concerns over 
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Arctic or otherwise, to submit information under internationally 
agreed procedures to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (“CLCS” or “Commission”), a review body of 
scientists created under the Convention.7 This article demonstrates 
how UNCLOS has provided Russia and its Arctic neighbors with a 
legal framework for scientific and diplomatic cooperation that can 
extend beyond mapping the Arctic continental shelf. It also 
underlines the fundamental reliance of law on science in the 
continental shelf mapping process, showing how recent mapping 
efforts have contributed to the unprecedented availability of 
information about the nature and history of the Arctic Ocean.8 In 
 
new standoffs in the Arctic Circle); C.J. Chivers, Eyeing Future Wealth, Russians 
Plant the Flag on the Arctic Seabed, Below the Polar Cap, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 
2007, at A8, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C07 
E2DB1630F930A3575BC0A9619C8B63 (speculating that securing the rights to 
the resources of the Arctic seabed, around which Canada, Denmark, Norway, 
Russia, and the United States have territory, could be the key to future national 
wealth and power). 
 7. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, Annex II (stating that the States Parties elect 
experts from the fields of geology, geophysics, or hydrography to serve on the 
twenty-one-member Commission). See generally Ted L. McDorman, The Role of 
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: A Technical Body in a 
Political World, 17 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 301, 312 (2002) (noting that, 
unlike international courts, the Commission is not an arbitrator of inter-state “lines 
in the water” disputes, but rather serves an advisory function for States regarding 
the application of Article 76); Betsy Baker, States Parties and the Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf, in LAW OF THE SEA, PROTECTION OF THE 
MARINE ENVIRONMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES: LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE 
THOMAS A. MENSAH 669, 680-86 (Tafsir Malik Ndiaye & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 
2007) (discussing the absence of legal expertise on the Commission as a potential 
source of questions as to the precise legal effect of its recommendations). 
 8. See LARRY A. MAYER & ANDREW A. ARMSTRONG, UNIV. OF N.H. CTR. 
FOR COASTAL AND OCEAN MAPPING, JOINT HYDROGRAPHIC CTR. CRUISE REPORT: 
USCGC ICEBREAKER HEALY (WAGB-20) U.S. LAW OF THE SEA CRUISE TO MAP 
THE FOOT OF THE SLOPE AND 2500-M ISOBATH OF THE U.S. ARCTIC OCEAN 
MARGIN 3 (2008) [hereinafter CCOM/JHC REPORT] (noting that the HEALY 08-05 
voyage to map the seafloor on the Chukchi Cap not only helps identify where the 
United States may extend its continental shelf under UNCLOS, but also generates 
data for understanding processes, habitats, and climate models, which may, in turn, 
lead to a fuller understanding of how the Arctic is changing); see also Deborah R. 
Hutchinson et al., Acquiring Marine Data in the Canada Basin, Arctic Ocean, 90 
EOS 197, 197-98 (2009) (stating that the UNCLOS gives coastal nations incentives 
to work together to address the difficulties associated with collecting geophysical 
data in the ice-covered Arctic); Larry Mayer et al., Challenges of Collecting Law 
of the Sea Data in the Arctic in INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POLICY, THE ARCTIC AND 
THE LAW OF THE SEA 125, 126 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2005) (explaining 
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doing so, it examines how lawyers and scientists approach the same 
treaty provisions from their respective disciplinary perspectives. The 
article concludes by considering how recent U.S. and Russian 
statements of national policy regarding the Arctic, and how nurturing 
joint scientific projects there, can strengthen science and 
international cooperation in the region. 
The five states with potential extended continental shelf above the 
Arctic Circle9—Canada, Denmark on behalf of Greenland, Norway, 
Russia, and the United States—are actively mapping the Arctic 
Ocean continental shelf as part of delimiting their respective shelves 
in accordance with Article 76 of the Convention.10 The sheer breadth 
of the Arctic continental shelf is strikingly evident in the 
International Bathymetric Chart of the Arctic Ocean (“IBCAO”).11 
Itself a product of international scientific cooperation in preparation 
for Article 76 mapping, the IBCAO renders with immediate clarity 
the most arresting features of Arctic Ocean bathymetry, such as the 
Lomonosov, Alpha-Mendeleev, and Gakkel Ridges.12  
Under the Convention, a coastal State has exclusive sovereign 
rights to explore and exploit the natural resources of its continental 
shelf.13 Within 200 nautical miles (“nm”) from its territorial sea 
baseline, the State is automatically entitled to exercise these rights 
without taking further action even if the physiographic shelf does not 
 
that the UNCLOS requires States seeking an extended continental shelf to measure 
“the absolute depth of the seafloor . . . the shape of the seafloor . . . the distance 
from the territorial baseline, and the thickness of the sediment column” in order to 
establish a claim). 
 9. See Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, Geographical 
Coverage, http://www.amap.no (follow “Geographical Coverage” hyperlink) (last 
visited Nov. 29, 2009) (defining the Arctic Circle as roughly north of 66 degrees, 
32 minutes latitude, but recognizing that different entities may differ about the 
exact demarcation of the region). 
 10. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 76(1) (defining the continental shelf as 
“the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond [a coastal 
State’s] territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the 
outer edge of the continental margin”). 
 11. See infra Appendix, fig.1. 
 12. See infra Part VI, notes 121-131 (discussing IBCAO as a collaborative 
effort to exchange data in preparation for Article 76 mapping). 
 13. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 77(1)-(2) (providing that no one may 
explore or exploit the natural resources of a coastal State’s continental shelf 
without the express consent of that coastal State, even if that coastal State is not 
exercising its own right to do so). 
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extend that far.14 Beyond 200 nm, a State may provide scientific 
evidence to establish the extent of the legally defined continental 
shelf in order to exercise the same rights.15 That extent is determined 
in part by measuring the “natural prolongation” of a coastal State’s 
land territory under water.16 The shelf beyond 200 nm is sometimes 
referred to as the “extended continental shelf,”a term of convenience 
that does not appear in the treaty.  
Each State has ten years from the date the Convention entered into 
force for that State to make a submission to the Commission.17 Of the 
five Arctic coastal States, Russia18 and Norway19 have met their 
deadlines and also received recommendations20 from the 
Commission, while Canada and Denmark on behalf of Greenland 
have until 2013 and 2014, respectively.21 As a non-party, the United 
States will not face a deadline until it accedes to the Convention.22 
 
 14. See id. arts. 76(1), 76(4), 77. 
 15. Id. art. 76(4). 
 16. Id. art. 76(1). 
 17. UNCLOS, supra note 4, Annex II, art. 4. 
 18. Comm'n on the Limits of the Cont'l Shelf (CLCS), Outer Limits of the 
Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Baselines: Submission by 
the Russian Federation, Ref. No. CLCS 01.2001.LOS (Dec. 20, 2001), available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_rus.htm 
[hereinafter Russ. CLCS Submission]. 
 19. Comm'n on the Limits of the Cont'l Shelf (CLCS), Outer Limits of the 
Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Baselines: Submission by 
the Kingdom of Norway, Ref. No. CLCS.07.2006.LOS (Nov. 26, 2006), available 
at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_nor.htm 
[hereinafter Nor. CLCS Submission]. 
 20. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Oceans 
and the Law of the Sea, ¶¶ 38-41, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. 
A/57/57/Add.1 (Oct. 8, 2002) [hereinafter Sec’y Gen. Report]; Recommendations 
of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Regard to the 
Submission Made by Norway in Respect of Areas in the Arctic Ocean, the Barents 
Sea and the Norwegian Sea on 27 November 2009 (adopted Mar. 27, 2009), 
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor06/nor_ 
rec_summ.pdf. 
 21. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Law of the 
Sea, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI
~6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en [hereinafter UNCLOS Ratifications] 
(listing the dates on which the Convention entered into force as: June 24, 2006 for 
Norway; March 12, 1997 for Russia; November 7, 2003 for Canada; and 
November 16, 2004 for Denmark). 
 22. States not party to Convention may not make submissions to the CLCS. As 
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Nonetheless, the United States commissioned a 2002 study on the 
potential for extending its shelf, prepared by the Center for Coastal 
and Ocean Mapping/Joint Hydrographic Center at the University of 
New Hampshire (“CCOM/JHC”),23 which has gathered over a 
million square kilometers of bathymetric data since 2003.24  
One significant reason states are interested in mapping the 
continental shelf is that Article 77 of the Convention gives them 
exclusive sovereign rights “for the purpose of exploring it and 
exploiting” the living and non-living resources of their portion of the 
shelf’s seabed and subsoil.25 Non-living resources include gas and 
oil, gas hydrates and minerals, and living resources include bottom 
dwelling “sedentary” species such as clams and chemo-synthetic 
communities such as black smokers.26 The sovereign rights 
articulated in Article 77 do not extend to resources in the water 
 
of November 2009, the United States had not acceded to the treaty, which 
President Bill Clinton first transmitted to the Senate for advice and consent on 
October 7, 1994, together with the 1994 Agreement relating to the Implementation 
of Part XI of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (signed July 29, 1994). 
The U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has recommended accession to 
the treaty on three separate occasions. Despite widespread support by all branches 
of the U.S. armed services, environmental, and industry groups, all three times a 
vote of the full Senate has been blocked by a handful of Senators. See, e.g., 
Michael J. Mattler, The Law of the Sea Convention: A View from the U.S. Senate, 
in INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POLICY, THE ARCTIC AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 33, 33 
(Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2005). 
 23. LARRY A. MAYER ET AL., UNIV. OF N.H. CTR. FOR COASTAL AND OCEAN 
MAPPING, JOINT HYDROGRAPHIC CTR., THE COMPILATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA 
RELEVANT TO A U.S. CLAIM UNDER UNITED NATIONS LAW OF THE SEA ARTICLE 
76: A PRELIMINARY REPORT (2002), available at http://ccom.unh.edu/publications 
/Mayer_02_Compilation_analysis_data_relevant_to_UNCLOS_76.pdf [hereinafter 
CCOM/JHC Article 76 Report]. 
 24. U.S. Dep’t. of State, U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project, 
http://www.state.gov/g/oes/continentalshelf/index.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2009) 
(noting that Congress and National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration 
(“NOAA”) have funded twelve JHC Arctic Ocean research cruises between 2003 
and 2009, most recently in August-September 2009). The inter-agency U.S. 
Extended Continental Shelf Task Force, chaired by the Department of State, 
oversees the mapping process for all U.S. coastal areas. See U.S. Dep’t of State, 
Ocean and Polar Affairs, http://www.state.gov/g/oes/ocns/opa/ (last visited Nov. 
29, 2009). 
 25. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 77(1) (emphasis added). 
 26. Id. art. 77(4) (defining “sedentary” organisms as those which are 
“immobile on or under the seabed or unable to move except in constant physical 
contact with the seabed or the subsoil” at the stage of harvest). 
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column such as fish stocks, which are covered under a separate 
regime for the Exclusive Economic Zone established under Part V of 
the Convention.27 Nor do the continental shelf rights, which by the 
terms of Article 77 are for the specific purpose of exploring and 
exploiting resources, amount to full sovereignty or even to a greater 
jurisdiction over the area such as is enjoyed in territorial waters.28 
Under the maritime zones elaborated in UNCLOS, all States enjoy 
certain navigational, research (with coastal State permission) and 
other rights over and on the continental shelf of a coastal State, 
which may, in some instances, be overlain by High Seas.29 
A 2008 survey conducted by the U.S. Geological Survey estimated 
that up to a third of the world’s remaining and technically 
recoverable hydrocarbon reserves may be located north of the Arctic 
Circle.30 A 2009 analysis of that survey concluded that the majority 
of such reserves are located offshore under less than 500 meters of 
water.31 These observations suggest that many reserves likely occur 
well within areas already clearly subject to respective national 
jurisdictions, rendering the outcome of the extended continental shelf 
mapping relatively unimportant when it comes to any “new” 
hydrocarbon resources being allocated to any Arctic States as a result 
of the Article 76 process. They also render inapposite many of the 
arguments fueling misconceptions that a new “gold rush” or “cold 
war” is imminent between the five northern circumpolar states. 
 
 27. Id. arts. 55-75 (setting forth the legal regime governing the “exclusive 
economic zone,” which is the area adjacent to, and not more than 200 nm beyond 
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured). 
 28. Compare id. art. 77(1)-(2) (giving coastal States exclusive rights over the 
continental shelf, but limiting these rights to exploration and exploitation of natural 
resources), with id. art. 2 (providing that the sovereignty of a coastal State over the 
territorial sea extends to air space over the territorial sea and the seabed and 
subsoil, limited only by the Convention and international law). 
 29. See, e.g., id. art. 90 (“Every State, whether coastal or land-locked, has the 
right to sail ships flying its flag on the high seas.”). 
 30. See Donald L. Gautier et al., Assessment of the Undiscovered Oil and Gas 
in the Arctic, 324 SCIENCE 1175, 1176 (2009) (specifying that U.S. Geological 
Survey estimated that the arctic region contains 13% of the world’s undiscovered 
oil resources and 30% of the world’s undiscovered natural gas resources). See 
generally U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 2008-3049 (Peter H. Stauffer ed. 
2008), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf (providing 
the raw data of the study in graphical form divided into various types of natural 
resources). 
 31. Gautier et al., supra note 30, at 1175. 
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I. THE IRRELEVANCE OF FLAGS AND THE 
IMPORTANCE OF ACCESSION 
In 2001, recognizing the legal certainty and legitimacy that the 
CLCS process would bring to its rights over the extended continental 
shelf, the Russian Federation became the first state32 to file a 
submission with the Commission.33 The submission covered areas of 
the continental shelf in the Central Arctic Ocean, as well as the 
Barents Sea, the Bering Sea, and the Sea of Okhotsk.34 In 2002, 
Russia also became the first state to receive a recommendation—a 
formal evaluation of its submission—from the Commission.35 The 
Commission requested “a number of points of clarification” as well 
as more data from the Russian Federation.36 Since then, Russia has 
been gathering additional data, working with its Arctic neighbors on 
shelf issues37 and  abiding  by the Rules of Procedure38 and Scientific 
 
 32. U.N. Div. for Ocean Aff. and the Law of the Sea, Submissions Through the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf, Pursuant to Article 76, Paragraph 8, of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm (last visited 
Nov. 29, 2009) [hereinafter CLCS Submissions]. Many States outside the Arctic 
are also mapping under Article 76, which applies to any coastal State that is party 
to the Convention. The Commission had received fifty-one submissions or 
preliminary information from over forty States as of December 2009. Id. At the 
Commission’s current rate of issuing some two recommendations per year in a 
nine-week session, Macnab has estimated it would take until 2059 to process all 
Submissions. Ron Macnab, Complications in Delimiting the Outer Continental 
Shelf, Presentation at The 33rd Center for Oceans and Law Policy Conference: 
Changes in the Arctic Environment and the Law of the Sea (May 20-22, 2009), 
available at http://www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/Macnab-outer-continental-shelf.pdf. 
 33. See Russ. CLCS Submission, supra note 18; see also Sec’y Gen. Report, 
supra note 20, ¶ 27 (acknowledging receipt of the Russian Federation's submission 
on December 20, 2001). 
 34. Sec’y Gen. Report, supra note 20, at ¶¶ 38-41. 
 35. CLCS Submissions, supra note 32. 
 36. Russ. CLCS Submission, supra note 18. 
 37. See generally Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, Canada and Arctic Politics: The 
Continental Shelf Extension, 39 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 343 (2008) [hereinafter 
Riddell-Dixon, Canada and Arctic Politics]; see also infra Part IV. 
 38. See U.N. Comm’n on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Rules of 
Procedure of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Part VII, 
U.N. Doc. CLCS/40/Rev.1 (Apr. 17, 2008) [hereinafter CLCS Rules of Procedure] 
(illustrating procedure for Commission’s consideration of a submission). 
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and Technical Guidelines39 established by the CLCS and the States 
Parties to the Convention.  
Despite persistent and often misleading media coverage to the 
contrary,40 neither Russia nor any of the four other Arctic coastal 
states are engaged in a “land grab” or fomenting “conflict in the 
Arctic.” There has been a significant effort on the part of the Arctic 
Ocean littoral states to follow the agreed rules of international law 
and each state is carrying out the costly scientific research necessary 
to provide legal certainty as to where it will delineate its respective 
extended continental shelf in the Arctic.41 Gathering sufficient data 
for an Article 76 submission is typically a multi-year, multi-ministry, 
and multi-million dollar undertaking.42 Given the difficulties, dangers 
 
 39. U.N. Comm’n on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Scientific and 
Technical Guidelines of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 
U.N. Doc. CLCS/11 (May 13, 1999) [hereinafter CLCS Scientific and Technical 
Guidelines]. 
 40. See, e.g., MacKenzie Funk, Healy Mapping Mission: Arctic Landgrab, 
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, May 2009, at 104 (portraying the current exploration of the 
Arctic as a competition between Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the 
United States). Notwithstanding the misleading implications of the title of “Arctic 
Landgrab,” this article does an excellent job of describing the Article 76 process 
and detailing the work of Larry Mayer and the 2007 HEALY ECS mapping cruise 
in the Arctic Ocean. The numerous maps accompanying the article give a visual 
summary of many of the issues involved in mapping the Arctic Ocean, the 
diminishing arctic sea ice, and the potential for hydrocarbon and other natural 
resource exploitation in the region. Id. at 110-117. 
 41. See, e.g., Riddell-Dixon, Canada and Arctic Politics, supra note 37; 
Russian Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 
Map Two Legend, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/ 
RUS_page5_Legend.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2009) (referring to maps published 
as part of the original Russian Submission to the CLCS “provisional” and “subject 
to more precise determination through negotiations” with neighboring States); Nor. 
CLCS Submission, supra note 19 (providing the full Submission to the 
Commission of Norway). 
 42. A number of developing countries, including Somalia, faced a May 2009 
deadline to submit a claim. Recognizing that many countries lack the financial and 
technical resources necessary to prepare the claim, in July 2008 the General 
Assembly approved a special process whereby States could file a statement of 
preliminary information to satisfy the ten year submission deadline. See, e.g., 
Somalia Submits Continental Shelf Information with Norwegian Assistance, 
NORWAY POST, http://www.norwaypost.no/content/view/21910/26/ (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2009) (reporting that Somalia, with Norwegian aid, became the first 
African country and the first developing country to make a preliminary submission 
indicating the outer limits of its continental shelf and highlighting the challenges 
developing coastal States face in making these submissions). 
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and expense of collecting relevant data in the Arctic Ocean, many 
states are exchanging data and, in some cases, engaging in joint 
missions to gather information.43  
In February 2007, the Russian polar explorer and member of the 
Duma, Artur Chilingarov carried off the technically stunning feat of 
using a two Mir manned mini-submersibles to plant a titanium 
Russian Federation flag at a depth of some 4200 meters at the 
geographic North Pole.44 The scientific community acknowledged 
this logistical and technological accomplishment for advancing 
funding of polar science generally, though with mixed views as to its 
actual scientific import.45 Political and media voices responded more 
hyperbolically, some asserting a new race for the Arctic,46 while 
diplomatic and scholarly sources pointed out in more measured tones 
that, at best, the event possessed mere symbolic value.47  
Article 77 of UNCLOS makes clear that any potential act of 
occupation such as flag planting has no legal significance with 
respect to coastal States’ “sovereign rights” over their continental 
shelves, which are exercised and exist independently of any 
statement or physical gesture and as a matter of right. As stated in 
 
 43. See infra Part IV. 
 44. See Russia Plants Flag Under N. Pole, BBC NEWS, Aug. 2, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6927395.stm (noting that unless the explorers 
navigated back to the exact spot of their descent, they risked being trapped 
underneath the Arctic ice sheet); Arthur Chilingarov: Russia’s Arctic Explorer, 
MOSCOW NEWS, July 17, 2008, http://www.mnweekly.ru/interview/20080717/ 
55338262.html (interview) (comparing Russia’s flag planting at the North Pole to 
the United States’ placing its flag on the Moon after the 1969 landing). 
 45. See, e.g., Tom Parfitt, Profile: Artur Chilingarov, Russia’s Polar Hero, 324 
SCIENCE 1382, 1384 (2009) (observing that one polar expert has said, “you can’t 
determine anything with a single bucket of mud from the Pole”). 
 46. See Chivers, supra note 6 (noting Russia’s renewed energy to engage in the 
“international competition” for extraction rights in the polar region). 
 47. See Evan Bloom, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks at the Third Symposium on 
the Impacts of an Ice-Diminishing Arctic on Naval and Maritime Operations at 
Annapolis, Maryland (June 11, 2009) (remarking that it is often overlooked that 
Chilingarov planted the flag during an expedition to gather bathymetric data for 
Submission to the CLCS); Richard A. Lovett, Russia Plants Underwater Flag, 
Claims Arctic Seafloor, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, Aug. 3, 2007, http://news. 
nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/08/07/070802-russia-pole.html (quoting Viktor 
Posyolov, deputy director of Russia’s Institute of World Ocean Geology and 
Mineral Resources, saying that the planting of the Russian flag “means nothing” 
from a legal standpoint). 
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Article 77(3): “The rights of the coastal State over the continental 
shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any 
express proclamation.”48 
On what, then, do the rights of the coastal State over the 
continental shelf depend? Beyond 200 nm, under the Convention 
they depend in part on solid scientific data and “interpretation of the 
bathymetry, geology, and nature of the seafloor in a region.”49 States 
use such data to establish “the outer edge of the continental margin,” 
the appurtenance of areas mapped to the State’s land territory,50 and 
the limits beyond which the continental shelf may not extend under 
Article 76.51 A State Party to the Convention submits its data to the 
Commission, which comprises twenty-one experts in geology, 
geophysics, or hydrography.52 Commissioners are elected by the 
States Parties with an eye to “equitable geographic representation,” 
but the Commissioners must “serve in their personal capacities.”53 As 
of December 2009, two of the five Arctic coastal States, Russia and 
Norway, had members on the CLCS.54 Article 76 provides that if a 
State uses the Commission recommendations as the basis of its 
published continental shelf limits, those limits are “final and 
binding.” 
A state that is not party to the Convention need not submit data to 
the Commission in order to establish the outer limits of its extended 
continental shelf. However, the absence of the Commission’s 
imprimatur is one basis for other states to call into question any 
state’s assertion of extended continental shelf rights. The fact that 
 
 48. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 77(3). 
 49. See CCOM/JHC REPORT, supra note 8, at 8. 
 50. See CLCS Scientific and Technical Guidelines, supra note 39, para. 2.1.2. 
(stating that the test of appurtenance consists in demonstrating that the natural 
prolongation of a coastal State’s land territory to the outer edge of the continental 
margin extends beyond a line delineated 200 nm from the baselines used to 
measure the breadth of the territorial sea). 
 51. See infra Part II, notes 64-84 (discussing these technical concepts in 
relation to the Article 76 mapping basics). 
 52. UNCLOS, supra note 4, Annex II, art. 2. 
 53. Id. Annex II, art. 2(1). 
 54. See Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Members of the 
Commission, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_ 
members.htm#Members (last visited Dec. 1, 2009) (showing current membership, 
elected in June 2007 for a term of five years). 
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non-parties may not make a submission to the CLCS55 is emphasized 
by proponents of U.S. accession to UNCLOS. Although the United 
States is actively mapping in anticipation of joining the Convention, 
it must also plan for the event of non-accession. Absent membership, 
the United States could proceed to publish what it considers to be the 
outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nm and rely on the 
less secure foundation of customary international law to support 
those assertions.  
II. HOW SCIENCE AND LAW APPROACH ARTICLE 
76 MAPPING 
The observation that scientists, policymakers, and lawyers—even 
while working together—take different approaches to understanding 
natural phenomena is not new, either generally56 or in the Polar 
Regions.57 In some respects, the history of modern multilateral 
environmental agreements58and certainly that of modern ocean 
management59 could be written as the story of scientists, lawyers, and 
 
 55. ILA, Legal Issues of the Outer Continental Shelf, 72 INT’L L. ASS’N REP. 
CONF. 215 (2006) [hereinafter ILA Second Report] (Conclusion 16: “the right to 
make a submission to the CLCS, and the concomitant right to establish final and 
binding outer limits on the basis of the recommendations of the Commission, only 
exist for States Parties to the Convention”); see also ILA, Legal Issues of the Outer 
Continental Shelf, 71 INT’L L. ASS’N REP. CONF. 2773 (2006) [hereinafter ILA 
First Report] (same). 
 56. For example, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf also 
gave rise to different physical and legal understandings of the continental shelf. 
See Convention on the Continental Shelf art. 1, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 
U.N.T.S. 311; G. Etzel Pearcy, The Continental Shelf: Physical vs. Legal 
Definition, 3 CAN. GEOGRAPHER 26 (1961) (comments by the Office of the 
Geographer, U.S. Department of State). 
 57. Cf. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND STEWARDSHIP IN THE ANTARCTIC 2 
(1993) (recommending improvements in scientific monitoring programs to bring 
them more in line with the Antarctic Treaty’s Protocol on Environmental 
Protection). 
 58. See, e.g., KATE O’NEILL, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 63-66, passim (2009) (providing an extensive bibliography of 
literature relevant to the interactions between law, science, and policy in shaping 
international approaches to addressing environmental concerns); Volker Röben, 
Institutional Developments Under Modern International Environmental 
Agreements, 4 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 363, 394 (2000) (“In order to assist 
States Parties to make complex trade-offs between scientific uncertainties and 
political judgments, many international environmental agreements have established 
a subsidiary body on scientific, technological and technical advice.”). 
 59. YOSHIFUMI TANAKA, A DUAL APPROACH TO OCEAN GOVERNANCE: THE 
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policymakers attempting to describe and regulate an environmental 
concern, translating their disciplines for one another with varying 
degrees of success. Changes in technology and scientific 
understanding of the natural phenomena a treaty attempts to regulate 
will necessarily impact how effectively the Convention can be 
implemented. In the case of Article 76 mapping, much has been 
learned about the relationship between the ocean floor and the 
continental shelf since UNCLOS was opened for signature in 1982,60 
in part because of the advances in the technology used to map the 
world’s oceans.61 By necessity, lawyers, scientists, and policymakers 
involved in Article 76 mapping educate each other about how these 
changes affect implementation of the Convention,62 and about how 
their respective disciplines approach the Convention and its 
requirements.63 
 
CASES OF ZONAL AND INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE 
SEA 209 (2008) (“It is no exaggeration to say that marine scientific research is a 
foundation of ocean governance.”). 
 60. See, e.g., Bernard Coakley & Betsy Baker, Mapping for Advocacy - Using 
Marine Geophysical Data to Establish the Limits of Extend Continent Shelves 
Under the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 89 EOS TRANS. AGU Fall Meeting 
Supp., Abstract GC33B-0780 (2008) (stating that, since the signing of the 
Convention in 1982, the “distinction between continental and ocean crust has been 
blurred by a complex array of hybrids that complicate this determination (eg. [sic] 
oceanic plateaus, hyper-extended continental crust, etc.)” requiring the mapping 
process to “somehow reconcile the great diversity of seafloor structure and 
composition that has been recognized with the simplistic language of the treaty 
itself”). 
 61. See id. (“Article 76 was written at a time when narrow-beam bottom 
sounder data was the primary bathymetric mapping tool. As a result it was built on 
a remarkably simplistic view of the seafloor that has been completely overturned 
by the swath bathymetric data collected over the last two decades.”). 
 62. See generally McDorman, supra note 7 (discussing the role of the 
Commission as a scientific body in what is essentially a political process). There is 
a burgeoning number of fora in which lawyers and scientists come together to 
discuss Article 76. In 2009 alone, representative gatherings in the United States 
included: “Changes in the Arctic Environment and the Law of the Sea,” the 33rd 
annual conference of The Center for Oceans Law and Policy (“COLP”) of the 
University of Virginia School of Law, May 20-22, 2009, in Seward, Alaska; the 
Third Symposium on the Impacts of an Ice-Diminishing Arctic on Naval and 
Maritime Operations, June 9-11, 2009, at the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, 
MD; and “Mounting Tensions and Melting Ice: Exploring the Legal and Political 
Future of the Arctic” hosted by the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 
February 6, 2009, in Nashville, TN. 
 63. See generally Chris M. Carleton et al., The Practical Realization of the 
Continental Shelf Limit, in CONTINENTAL SHELF LIMITS 268 (Peter J. Cook & 
Chris M. Carleton eds., 2000) (detailing the scientific techniques available to 
delineate the outer limits of the continental shelf under Article 76). 
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At a very basic level, States mapping the continental shelf beyond 
200 nm are attempting to show how far out their land mass extends 
underwater, by locating what the Convention calls “the outer edge of 
the continental margin.”64 To do so, a State must first demonstrate 
that the areas mapped are appurtenant to the State’s continental land 
mass.65 If it satisfies this test of appurtenance,66 the State may then 
locate the edge of the continental margin.67 It does this by finding the 
“foot of the continental slope,” which involves drawing lines 
between fixed points that are located a certain distance beyond the 
slope under one of two formulae set out in Article 76.68 Next, the 
State must apply constraint lines to the areas so mapped, so that its 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm does not extend indefinitely.69 If the 
coastal State meets these three steps, it may then delimit its 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm.70  
These Convention terms of art—”outer edge of the continental 
margin” and “foot of the continental slope,” as well as “submarine 
ridges” and “submarine elevations”—are juridical constructs used by 
those who drafted the treaty to give legal designations to the natural 
features of the continental shelf and ocean floor.71 These legal terms 
 
 64. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 76(1), (4)(a). 
 65. U.N. DIV. FOR OCEAN AFF. AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, TRAINING MANUAL 
FOR DELINEATION OF THE OUTER LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF BEYOND 200 
NAUTICAL MILES AND FOR PREPARATION OF SUBMISSIONS TO THE COMMISSION ON 
THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF, at I-26, U.N. Sales No. E.06.v4 (2006) 
[hereinafter TRAINING MANUAL]. 
 66. CLCS Scientific and Technical Guidelines, supra note 39, para. 2.2.2. 
(defining “test of appurtenance” as the process for examining how a coastal State 
establishes the outer edge of the continental margin to determine its legal 
entitlement to the extended continental shelf under art. 76(4)). 
 67. Id. 
 68. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 76(4)(i)-(ii). To create both formulae lines, the 
fixed points located in this manner are connected in 60 nm intervals. Id. The first 
prong of Article 76(4) describes the so-called Gardiner formula, which results in 
points being located where the sediment thickness is 1% of the distance back to the 
foot of the slope. Id. art. 76(4)(a)(i). The simpler Hedberg formula found in the 
second prong of Article 76 locates points 60 nm from the foot of the slope. States 
may combine the points resulting from these two lines to their advantage. Id. art. 
76(4)(a)(ii). 
 69. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 65, at I-26. 
 70. CLCS Scientific and Technical Guidelines, supra note 39, para. 2.2.3. 
 71. See TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 65, at I-13, I-14 (noting that 
UNCLOS’s legal designations grew out of State practice and represent a balance 
between States’ divergent interests in simultaneously affirming their rights to areas 
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do not always comport with how scientists understand those natural 
features.72 For example, under Article 76, the continental margin 
“comprises the submerged prolongation of the land mass of the 
coastal State, and consists of the seabed and subsoil of the shelf, the 
slope and the rise.”73 The Convention subsumes those three 
elements—the shelf, slope, and rise—into one legally defined term: 
the continental shelf.74 Scientists, on the other hand, have 
traditionally separated the three elements and considered the 
continental shelf to be just one component of the margin.75 Figure 2 
in the Appendix depicts these different physiographic and legal 
approaches to the continental shelf.76 
Locating the “foot of the continental slope” helps to delineate the 
outer limits of a coastal State’s extended continental shelf.77 
Geologists, geophysicists, and hydrographers who map the ocean and 
interpret data gathered on mapping expeditions work to provide the 
bright lines and individual points that the Convention encompasses 
with the legal term “foot of the continental slope.”78 To assist them, 
 
beyond the territorial sea based on the adjacency of the continental shelf to their 
land territory and preventing interference with traditional governance of the high 
seas). 
 72. See, e.g., id., at I-10 (stating that although the legal regime draws on 
scientific concepts, it adopts more expansive definitions in order to accommodate 
the interests of States with continental shelves of varying sizes). 
 73. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 76(3). 
 74. Id., art. 76(1) (identifying the continental shelf as a unified “natural 
prolongation” of land territory). 
 75. See TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 65, at I-11 (explaining that the 
scientific definition of “continental shelf” encompasses the “relatively flat and 
shallow . . . submerged part of the continent,” which extends to the continental 
slope). 
 76. See infra Appendix, fig.2; see also, e.g., SUZETTE V. SUAREZ, THE OUTER 
LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF: LEGAL ASPECTS OF THEIR ESTABLISHMENT 
239-252 (2008) (discussing differences in the legal and scientific understandings of 
the continental shelf). 
 77. In paragraph 5.1.1., the CLCS Scientific and Technical Guidelines provide: 
“The Commission recognizes that the foot of the continental slope is an essential 
feature that serves as the basis for entitlement to the extended continental shelf and 
the delineation of its outer limits.” CLCS Scientific and Technical Guidelines, 
supra note 39, para. 5.1.1. 
 78. See Carleton et al., supra note 63, at 271 (“Clearly, there is no ‘exact’ foot 
of the slope; there is, rather, a zone in which judgment must be applied to 
determine the most likely location of the feature which is taken to mark the edge of 
the continent.”). 
BAKER_TO PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2010  2:10 PM 
266 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [25:251 
the CLCS Scientific and Technical Guidelines (“Guidelines”) aim to 
clarify the Commission’s interpretations of the Convention’s 
“scientific, technical and legal terms.”79 For example, Article 76(4) 
of the Convention provides: “In the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, the foot of the continental slope shall be determined as the 
point of maximum change in the gradient at its base.”80 The 
Guidelines elaborate, stating that the “identification of the region 
defined as the base of the continental slope” is one of “the 
fundamental requirements posed” by Article 76(4), locating the point 
of maximum change in gradient at the base is the other.81  
“Natural prolongation” and the “test of appurtenance” are two 
more legal terms contained in or arising from the Convention that 
scientists had not typically applied to the shelves and seafloors of the 
world’s oceans. Article 76(1) defines the continental shelf of a 
coastal State as comprising “the seabed and subsoil of the submarine 
areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural 
prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental 
margin.”82 The Guidelines note that Article 76(4)(a) 
suggests the formulation of a test of appurtenance in order to entitle a 
coastal State to extend the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond the 
limit set by the 200-nautical-mile distance criterion. This test consists in 
the demonstration of the fact that the natural prolongation of its land 
territory to the outer edge of the continental margin extends beyond a line 
delineated at a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.83 
The relationship of the natural prolongation to the test of 
appurteancne to each other and to the Russian submission to the 
Commission is explored below.  
 
 
 79. CLCS Scientific and Technical Guidelines, supra note 39, para. 1.3. 
 80. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 76(4)(b). 
 81. CLCS Scientific and Technical Guidelines, supra note 39, at para. 5.1.3. 
(emphasis added). 
 82. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art.76(1) (emphasis added). 
 83. CLCS Scientific and Technical Guidelines, supra note 39, para. 2.1.2. 
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III. THE 2001 RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
SUBMISSION TO THE CLCS 
When combined with data being gathered as part of the Article 76 
process, the test of appurtenance is especially relevant in the Arctic 
Ocean, where the Russian Federation, Denmark, and Canada are 
each attempting to show that the Lomonosov Ridge is a natural 
prolongation of its respective land mass.84 The Lomonosov Ridge 
effectively bisects the Arctic Ocean, separating the Amerasian Basin 
from the Eurasian Basin.85 The Russian Federation, in its submission 
to the CLCS in 2001, asserted some degree of appurtenance of the 
Lomonosov Ridge to its continental land mass.86 If the Lomonosov 
Ridge is deemed appurtenant, the question still remains as to whether 
it is a submarine ridge subject to the 350 nm cutoff discussed above 
in Part II or whether, as would favor Russia, it is a submarine 
elevation.87 
As is the case with most submissions, at the time of Russia’s 2001 
submission relatively few details were known about it because the 
Article 76 process is largely confidential. All meetings are held in 
private unless the Commission decides otherwise.88 As to the States’ 
submissions, the Rules of Procedure require that the Commission 
make public only the Executive Summary that States are required to 
 
 84. See, e.g., U.N. Comm’n on the Limits of the Continental Shelf , Statement 
Made by the Deputy Minister for Natural Resources of the Russian Federation 
During Presentation of the Submission Made by the Russian Federation to the 
Commission, Made on 28 March 2002, U.N. Doc. CLCS/31, at 4-6 (Apr. 5, 2002) 
(stressing that the categorization of the Lomonosov Ridge is “of fundamental 
importance” to Russia’s submission to the CLCS); Nele Matz-Lück, Planting the 
Flag in Arctic Waters: Russia’s Claim to the North Pole, 1 GÖTTINGEN J. INT’L L. 
235, 250 (2009) (emphasizing correctly that there is “no broad consensus in the 
Arctic geoscientific community whether or not elevations such as the Lomonosov 
Ridge are natural prolongations”). 
 85. See infra Appendix, fig.1. 
 86. See Russ. CLCS Submission, supra note 18, Map 2. 
 87. On the Russian submission generally, see Ron Macnab & Lindsay Parson, 
Continental Shelf Submissions: The Record to Date, 21 INT'L J. MARINE & 
COASTAL L. 309 (2006). See also Matz-Lück, supra note 84, at 250 (“Russia 
emphasizes the qualification of the Lomonosov and Alpha-Mendeleev Ridge as 
‘submarine elevations’ and not as ‘submarine ridges.’”). 
 88. See CLCS Rules of Procedure, supra note 38, R. 23 (private meetings); id. 
Annex II, para. 4.2. (allowing a State to classify “any data and other material[] not 
otherwise publicly available that it submits in accordance with” the CLCS Rules of 
Procedure and Commission proceedings as private and confidential). 
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provide, including relevant charts and coordinates.89 With respect to 
the Commission’s own recommendations, it must make public a 
summary, which “shall not contain information which might be of a 
confidential nature and/or which might violate the proprietary rights 
of the coastal State” to data and information submitted; further the 
recommendation summary need contain only minimal references to 
those parts of the Commission recommendations “related to” the 
limits eventually deposited by the State under Article 76(9).90 Critics 
have suggested that this lack of transparency diminishes the 
credibility of the Article 76 process.91 
In its recommendation responding to Russia’s 2001 submission, 
the Commission requested more data with respect to the Central 
Arctic Ocean, and recommended that Russia revise its submission 
accordingly for later consideration.92 In addition, five states—
Canada, Denmark, Japan, Norway, and the United States—filed 
responses to the Secretary General’s published executive summary of 
the Russian submission.93 The U.S. Notification rejected out of hand 
any possibility that the Lomonosov Ridge could be a natural 
prolongation, even though the ridge will not be of any direct 
significance to any possible U.S. submission. The U.S. Notification 
stated summarily that “[t]he ridge is a freestanding feature in the 
deep, oceanic part of the Arctic Ocean basin, and not a natural 




 89. Id. R. 50. 
 90. CLCS Rules of Procedure, supra note 38, Annex III, Part V, para. 11(3); id. 
R. 54. 
 91. See Ron Macnab, The Case for Transparency in the Delimitation of the 
Outer Continental Shelf in Accordance with UNCLOS Article 76, 35 OCEAN DEV. 
& INT’L L. 1, 11, 14-16 (2004) (recommending the use of procedures that 
encourage States to make public even more information as part of their 
submissions to the CLCS in order to quell skepticism of the submission process). 
 92. See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating 
to International Law, U.S. Reaction to Russian Continental Shelf Claim, 96 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 969, 970 (2002). As of November 2009, Russia had not yet filed the 
revised Submission. 
 93. See Russ. CLCS Submission, supra note 18; see also Matz-Lück, supra 
note 84, at 249 (detailing further other states’ responses, none of which addressed 
the substance of Russia’s submission to the extent the U.S. response did). 
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State.”94 It also questioned Russian assertions with respect to the 
nature of the Alpha-Mendeleev Ridge.95  
 Developments since publication of the Russian submission, the 
CLCS recommendation, and the U.S. response indicate how Article 
76 mapping is making possible new understandings of the Arctic 
Ocean continental shelf, and how policymakers rely fundamentally 
on science in the Article 76 process, whether making submissions or 
responding to them. Notwithstanding the U.S. Notification in 2002, 
Russia has continued to gather data in the Central Arctic Ocean, 
presumably some of which it hopes will support its position that the 
Lomonosov Ridge is a natural prolongation of Russian land territory. 
Canada and Denmark have since carried out joint seismic surveys in 
the area to try to establish appurtenance between the Lomonosov 
Ridge and Canada and Greenland, respectively.96 Russia and Canada 
are exchanging data on related issues.97 In 2003, Russia organized an 
international conference on the question of ridges, again driving 
scientific exchange98 and, at a 2007 meeting, shared charts, maps, 
and data from its 2001 submission with scientists from Canada and 
Denmark, thereby giving them access to information that was 
otherwise confidential under the processes outlined above.99 While 
the United States has not offered any official comments amending its 
 
 94. United States of America: Notification Regarding the Submission Made by 
the Russian Federation to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 
U.N. Ref. CLCS.01.2001.LOS/USA, at 3 (Mar. 18, 2002) [hereinafter U.S. 
Notification]; see also U.S ARCTIC RES. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 
2002, at 12 (2002), available at http://www.arctic.gov/publications/usarc_2002_ 
annual.pdf (“Art Grantz and [Gary] Brass [then Executive Director, U.S. Arctic 
Research Commission] felt some of the Russian claim was not justified by the 
science and this was conveyed to the State Department.”). 
 95. U.S. Notification, supra note 94, at 3. 
 96. Nat. Resources Can., Using Science to Delineate the Limits of Canada’s 
Continental Shelf, at 2, available at http://cgc.rncan.gc.ca/org/atlantic/pdf/unclos 
_e.pdf. 
 97. Russia, Canada Agree to Share Information on Continental Shelf 
Demarcation, RUSSIA & CIS BUSINESS & FINANCIAL NEWSWIRE (Mar. 30, 2007). 
 98. Macnab & Parson, supra note 87, at 311-312. 
 99. Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, Canada’s Arctic Continental Shelf Extention: 
Debunking Myths, POLICY OPTIONS, Sept. 2008, at 39, 42 [hereinafter Riddell-
Dixon, Canada’s Arctic Continental Shelf Extension] (“This sharing gave 
Canadian and Danish officials access to the details and analysis that would not 
otherwise be available to them, as the specifics of submissions to the commission 
are confidential.”). 
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stance in the 2002 Notification, State Department representatives 
have commented that the U.S. view of Arctic geology is evolving 
and that, in hindsight, the Notification reflected an inadequate 
appreciation of the scientific complexities involved.100  
New information regarding the Alpha-Mendeleev Ridge that is 
emerging from Article 76 mapping work offers a window into how 
theories about the Arctic Ocean shelf are competing and developing, 
requiring policy makers to evaluate and translate these changes into 
decisions about national submissions to the Commission. For 
example, one observation in the 2002 U.S. Notification to the 
Russian submission regarding the Alpha-Mendeleev Ridge was to 
question the composition of informally reported Russian samples 
(“pebble and cobble suites”) in the region. The U.S. concluded that 
the suites “can be shown to have originated in northwestern Canada, 
and to have been distributed widely in the Amerasian Basin . . . by 
glacial icebergs. They, therefore, cannot represent local bedrock on 
Mendeleev Ridge” and, by implication, could not be considered to be 
continental crust.101 Since that time, initial results from dredges 
elsewhere on the Alpha-Mendeleev Ridge system, which must still 
undergo further analysis, suggest that current understanding of this 
feature may need re-evaluation and have called into question 
previous interpretations of the origins of that ridge system.  
Considering the results of more detailed analyses of these and 
other samples with the outcomes of studies such as those cited in the 
2002 U.S. Notification will make for the most scientifically sound 
U.S. delimitation of its continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean, 
regardless of whether it does so as a State Party to the Convention or 
independently thereof. Having the most complete picture of its own 
continental shelf will also allow the United States to better evaluate 
whatever information is eventually made public about Russia’s 
subsequent submission to the Commission with respect to the Central 
Arctic Ocean. Additionally, the transparency with which 
 
 100. See, e.g., Margaret Hayes, U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of Ocean and Polar 
Affairs, Remarks at the American University International Law Review 
Symposium: Russia and the Rule of Law, Arctic Panel (Feb. 11, 2009), video 
available at http://media.wcl.american.edu/Mediasite/Viewer/?peid=70877630-
e145-4946-bf19-04b88b69d010. 
 101. U.S. Notification, supra note 94, at 3. 
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CCOM/JHC is making its mapping data available102 may serve as an 
impetus for other States to reconsider their more confidential policies 
with respect to their Article 76 data. Arguably, the more States know 
about each other’s potential submissions, the more confidence they 
will place in the Article 76 mapping process.103 This transparency 
with respect to scientific data could in turn bolster confidence in 
policy and other statements from the Russian Federation that its 
interests are best served by following the Convention’s processes for 
delimiting the continental shelf, as explored in Part IV.  
IV. UNITED STATES AND RUSSIAN ARCTIC 
POLICY 
On September 17, 2008, the Russian Security Council issued a 
Maritime Strategy document that focused on the central importance 
of the Arctic to its national security.104 On January 9, 2009, in the last 
days of his administration, then-U.S. President George W. Bush 
signed a dual Presidential Directive with the subtitle, “Arctic Region 
Policy” (“2009 U.S. Arctic Region Policy”).105 These Russian and 
U.S. documents, and other statements from Russian government 
sources have at least one message in common: that delimitation of 
the Arctic continental shelf under international law is desirable for 
legal certainty and strengthening national security. 
 
 102. See CCOM/JHC REPORT, supra note 8 (publishing extensive seafloor 
mapping data due to its usefulness for Convention purposes and to promote better 
understanding of conditions in the Arctic). 
 103. See Macnab, supra note 91, at 11, 14-16 (arguing that transparency breeds 
credibility, as well as allows States to learn from each other about the best ways to 
make submissions to the Commission). 
 104. See Statement of the Security Council of the Russian Federation (Sept. 18, 
2008), available at http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/98.html (Russian-language 
source) (proclaiming Russia’s national interests in the region as: a strategic 
resource to tackle socio-economic development, to preserve the region as a zone of 
peace and cooperation, to conserve the region’s unique ecosystem, and for use as a 
northern sea route). 
 105. See National Security Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security 
Presidential Directiive 25 on Arctic Region Policy, Office of the Press Sec’y (Jan. 
12, 2009) [hereinafter NSPD 66/HSPD 25] (stating the United States’ policy 
objectives in the arctic region as: meeting national security needs; protecting the 
Arctic environment; ensuring “natural resource management and economic 
development;” strengthening cooperation between the eight Arctic nations; 
involving the indigenous communities in decisions; and enhancing scientific 
monitoring and research). 
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The 2009 U.S. Arctic Region Policy supersedes an Arctic Policy 
that had been in place since 1994. The earlier Directive,106 which 
otherwise remains in place with respect to Antarctic Policy, set forth 
U.S. policy with respect to both the Northern and Southern Polar 
Regions.107 The 2009 Arctic Region Policy, under the paired rubrics 
of National Security and Homeland Security, refers generally in its 
second paragraph to the law of the sea108 and directly to UNCLOS in 
three places: calling for U.S. accession,109 acknowledging the 
fisheries regime established under the Convention and related 
agreements,110 and recognizing the Convention as the “most effective 
way to achieve international recognition and legal certainty for our 
extended continental shelf.”111 
A closer reading of the 2009 U.S. Arctic Region Policy underlines 
the fact that science and law, working together, are essential 
foundations to effective, considered, and visible U.S. participation in 
the Arctic. The document opens by invoking the legal bases for its 
implementation112 and contains references to UNCLOS and 
international obligations throughout.113 Under “Extended Continental 
Shelf and Boundary Issues,” Part III.D.3. refers to the existing 
maritime treaty between Russia and the United States,114 as well as 
other legal bases for resolving such issues.  
On the scientific side, Part III.E. dedicates five paragraphs to 
“Promoting International Scientific Cooperation,” and contains 
 
 106. Presidential Decision Directive 26, Antarctic: Funding of the United States 
Antarctic Program, Including South Pole Station (Mar. 9, 1996). 
 107. NSPD 66/HSPD 25, supra note 105, pt. I.A. 
 108. Id. pt. I.B (“This directive shall be implemented in a manner consistent 
with the Constitution and laws of the United States, with the obligations of the 
United States under the treaties and other international agreements to which the 
United States is a party, and with customary international law as recognized by the 
United States, including with respect to the law of the sea.”). 
 109. Id. pt. III.C.4, C.5.d. 
 110. Id. pt. III.H.4. 
 111. Id. pt. III.D.I. 
 112. Id. pt. I.B. 
 113. Id. pt. III.C. 
 114. See id. pt. III.D.3 (“The United States and Russia are abiding by the terms 
of a maritime boundary treaty concluded in 1990, pending its entry into force. The 
United States is prepared to enter the agreement into force once ratified by the 
Russian Federation.”). 
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multiple references to international and multinational cooperation.115 
These five paragraphs elaborate on the basic premise that scientific 
research “is vital for the promotion of the United States interests in 
the Arctic region” and specifically names the Russian Federation in 
calling for greater access for researchers to all parts of the Arctic 
Ocean: “Better coordination with the Russian Federation, facilitating 
access to its domain, is particularly important.”116 2009 U.S. Arctic 
Region Policy also promotes the “active involvement of all Arctic 
nations . . . in order to advance scientific understanding that could 
provide the basis for assessing future impacts and proposed response 
strategies” with respect to environmental and climate change.117 
The Russian Federation’s latest formal policy document with 
respect to the Arctic was made public after the 2009 U.S. policy but 
predated it by several months. In March 2009, the Russian Security 
Council released a document118 entitled, “The Fundamentals of State 
Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic in the Period up to 
2020 and Beyond” (Osnovy gosudarstvennoi politiki Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii v Artike na period do 2020 goda i dalneishuiu 
perspektivu), which president Dmitry Medvedev had signed on 
September 18, 2008.119 That same month, the Russian Security 
Council had convened meetings relevant to the Arctic120 and 
President Medvedev also visited the Chukotka Autonomous Area, 
calling it a “vital link of the Northern Sea Route.”121 In part as a 
 
 115. Id. pt. III.E. 
 116. Id. pt. III.E. (“Successful conduct of U.S. research in the Arctic region 
requires access throughout the Arctic Ocean and to terrestrial sites, as well as 
viable international mechanisms for sharing access to research platforms and 
timely exchange of samples, data, and analyses."). 
 117. Id. pt. III.E.3. 
 118. See Dmitry Solovyov, Russia to Boost Arctic Troops to Defend Resources, 
REUTERS, Mar. 27, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/environment 
News/idUSTRE52P5NS20090327 (reporting on the Russian Security Council’s 
release of a paper outlining its Arctic policy until 2020, which includes the creation 
of new troop formation to secure Russia’s Arctic borders). 
 119. See Katarzyna Zysk, Comment, Russian: Arctic Strategy, September 2008, 
Geopolitics in the North: Arctic Strategy Documents, http://www.geopoliticsnorth. 
org/index.php?option=com_content&iew=article&id=84:arctic-strategy-documents 
&catid=1:latest-news (last visited Jan. 12, 2010) (describing the strategy's 
emphasis on the importance of the Arctic to Russia's wealth and development). 
 120. Solovyov, supra note 119. 
 121. Medvedev Calls for Developing Chukotka Infrastructure, PRIME-TASS, Sep. 
23, 2008, available at http://www.prime-tass.com/news/print.asp?id=444768& 
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response to concerns that these and other actions foretold increased 
Russian aggression in the Arctic, the Russian Foreign Ministry 
asserted with respect to the region, that “Russia strictly abides by the 
norms and principles of international law and is firmly determined to 
act within existing international agreements and mechanisms.”122 
President Medvedev noted further that Russia should “wrap up all 
the formalities for drawing the external border in the continental 
shelf” in the Arctic.123 These responses, and indeed the policies 
themselves, can be seen as an invocation of the rule of law, not an 
assertion of undue regional influence, to reach a state of legal 
certainty for both the Russian Federation and all others interested in 
establishing clear delimitations in the Arctic Ocean.124 
CONCLUSION: SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION 
The requirements in Article 76 of UNCLOS for delimiting the 
continental shelf have led the Russian Federation, the United States, 
and their Arctic neighbors to rely on common scientific processes 
and agreed rules of international law in preparing to establish the 
outer limits of their continental shelves. International teams of 
 
topicid=0; see also Caitlyn Antrim, Russia and the Changing Geopolitics of the 
Arctic, WORLD POL. REV., May/June 2009, at 8, available at http://www.world 
politicsreview-digital.com/wpr/20090506/?pg=10 (describing the geopolitical 
aspects of the Northern Sea Route). 
 122. Russia Denies Plans to Carry Out “Unilateral Partition” of Oil-Rich 
Arctic, DOW JONES NEWSWIRES, Sept. 23, 2008, available at 
http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=67031; see also Russia Strictly 
Follows Regulatory Framework for Arctic Ocean, ITAR-TASS, Sept. 23, 2008 
(explaining that the President is preparing a federal law on the southern border of 
the Russian Arctic zone that includes determining which Russian Federation 
entities touch the border and how to plan for the socio-economic development 
expected in those entities). 
 123. Russia Denies Plans to Carry Out “Unilateral Partition” of Oil-Rich 
Arctic, supra note 123; see also Katarzyna Zysk, Geopolitics in the Arctic: The 
Russian Security Perspective, in CLIMATE OF OPINION: THE STOCKHOLM 
NETWORK'S ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT UPDATE, ISSUE 12 - THE ARCTIC : MARCH 
2009, Mar. 2009, at 7, 8 (stating that Russia "has acted in compliance with 
international law in pursuing its territorial claims”). 
 124. Zysk, supra note 120 (remarking that Russia lists “[d]efining the limits of 
[its] continental shelf by 2015 . . . as a top priority”); see also Antrim, supra note 
122 (pointing out that UNCLOS and its jurisdictional dispute rules have been 
around for over twenty-five years and that “the [C]onvention ensures that, despite 
alarmist forecasts, Arctic disputes, when they arise, are likely to be matters of law 
and diplomacy rather than conflict and stalemate”). 
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scientists have worked together on gathering mapping data or 
exchanging information in the Arctic.125 Arctic Ocean littoral states 
have used the peaceful processes of diplomatic notifications for 
questioning or responding to the first Russian Federation submission 
to the CLCS. Combined with the recently articulated Russian 
Federation and United States policies regarding the Arctic Region, 
these developments suggest that prospects for increased scientific 
collaboration between the two countries could be improving. 
Mutually beneficial joint research could overcome territorial, 
political, and security concerns that may be preventing Russian 
scientists from participating in a broader range of collaborative 
projects.126   
The IBCAO map referenced at the outset of this article and 
reproduced in Figure 1 in the Appendix, is one example of successful 
circumpolar scientific cooperation driven by the Convention. In the 
early stages of preparing for Article 76 mapping, scientists 
collaborated to produce the IBCAO127 by consolidating data from 
various national databases. IBCAO produced its first chart in just 
three years, from 1997 to 2000, and issued version 2.0 in 2008. 
Writing in 2001, IBCAO participants explained:  
[I]nvestigators from the five coastal States have met regularly since 1996 
to discuss the coordination of scientific and technical procedures involved 
in the implementation of Article 76, and to develop a common 
understanding of the factors peculiar to the Arctic Ocean that impact upon 
those procedures, e.g. the identification and classification of natural 
prolongations, the criteria for locating the foot of the slope and the 
Gardiner line, etc. To the limit of practicability, the investigators have 
also agreed to construct common models of bathymetry and sediment 
 
 125. See Riddell-Dixon, Canada’s Arctic Continental Shelf Extension, supra 
note 99, at 40-42. 
 126. That such concerns are preventing full Russian participation in circumpolar 
research efforts has been expressed in various fora, including “Changes in the 
Arctic Environment and the Law of the Sea,” the 33rd annual conference of The 
Center for Oceans Law and Policy (“COLP”), May 20-22, 2009, in Seward, 
Alaska, and the Third Symposium on the Impacts of an Ice-Diminishing Arctic on 
Naval and Maritime Operations, June 9-11, 2009, at the Naval Academy in 
Annapolis, MD. 
 127. Ron Macnab et al., Cooperative Preparations for Determining the Outer 
Limit of the Juridicial Continental Shelf in the Arctic Ocean: A Model for Regional 
Collaboration in Other Parts of the World?, IBRU BOUNDARY & SEC. BULL., 
Spring 2001, at 86, 87; infra Appendix, fig.1. 
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thickness, so that inconsistencies between their respective results are 
caused by varying methods of interpretation, and not by incompatibilities 
between data holdings.128 
The International Arctic Science Committee, the 
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, and the International 
Hydrographic Office all endorsed the IBCAO project.129 The “limit 
of practicability” to the “common models” referenced above have 
not prevented further collaboration between scientists involved in 
mapping the Arctic Ocean, suggesting that similar approaches might 
be followed in other research areas.130 As previously noted, Russian 
and Canadian scientists are exchanging information relevant to 
determining whether the Lomonosov Ridge is a natural prolongation 
of the continental landmass, and Canadian and Danish researchers 
are pursuing joint seismic operations to explore the same question.131 
The United States and Canada have carried out joint mapping cruises 
in the Arctic Ocean since 2008 and have plans to continue such 
collaboration.132 Whether these activities will lead to joint 
submissions by one or more Arctic states remains to be seen. 
Beyond continental shelf mapping and the requirements of Article 
76 of UNCLOS, basic arctic geosciences could provide a useful 
realm of cooperative endeavor. One ongoing cooperative project 
between United States and Russian scientists involves geologic 
history and plate tectonic reconstruction research in the Russian Far 
East.133 Workshops such as those held to identify common research 
interests in the region could serve as blueprints for collaborative 
work in other fields. Another simple model to improve international 
 
 128. Id. at 90. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. (commenting on upcoming projects involving aeromagnetic data). 
 131. Nat. Resources Can., supra note 96. 
 132. See U.S. Dep’t. of State, U.S.-Canada Joint Expedition to Survey the 
Extended Continental Shelf in the Arctic (July 28, 2009), available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/126588.htm (observing that, in addition 
to advancing the mapping efforts of both countries, the joint expedition “saves 
millions of dollars”). 
 133. See Joint U.S.-Russia Workshop on the Plate Tectonic Evolution of 
Northeast Russia (Dec. 9-12, 2004), http://pangea.stanford.edu/research/structure/ 
nerussia/index.html (stating that the primary goal of the workshop, which brought 
together key Russian and American research scientists, was to “to frame a long-
term scientific plan and to outline potential collaborative projects that utilize 
existing expertise, databases, laboratories and institutional capabilities”). 
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scientific cooperation is to alternate the venues for important 
conferences so that each country can host such gatherings.134  
Given the number of joint efforts by Arctic states to gather data 
relevant to mapping the continental shelf outlined above, it is 
important to recall that Article 76 itself contains no specific reference 
to scientific cooperation. UNCLOS as a whole, however, is replete 
with references to cooperation.135 This is not the place to discuss at 
length the importance of cooperation to the Convention’s regime for 
Marine Scientific Research (Part XIII),136 but rather to point to 
Article 242’s requirement that states and competent international 
organizations “shall . . . promote international cooperation in marine 
scientific research for peaceful purposes.” This requirement is not 
only to enable such research but to “integrate the efforts of scientists 
in studying the essence of phenomena and processes occurring in the 




 134. For example, the 2009-2010 Sixth International Conference on Arctic 
Margins (“ICAM”) will be in Fairbanks, Alaska. Holding the 2013-1014 Seventh 
ICAM in St. Petersburg would allow Russian scientists to showcase their related 
work. Previous ICAMs have been held in Canada, Germany, Russia, and the 
United States. “The [ICAM] was founded by the U.S. Department of the Interior 
Minerals Management Service in 1991 with the underlying two-point theme of 
Arctic understanding and international cooperation in Arctic research. To these 
ends, ICAM has provided a forum for the exchange of information and 
presentation of research.” International Conference on Arctic Margins, 
http://www.mms.gov/Alaska/icam/background.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2009). 
 135. See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 4, pmbl.; id. arts. 194, 197, 200, 204, 206 
and 234 (mentioning joint measures or cooperation). 
 136. See, e.g., FLORIAN H.TH. WEGELEIN, MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: THE 
OPERATION AND STATUS OF RESEARCH VESSELS AND OTHER PLATFORMS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (providing detailed studies of the Convention’s 
Marine Scientific Research regime); MONTSERRAT GORINA-YSERN, AN 
INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH (2003) (same); see 
also J. Ashley Roach, Marine Scientific Research and the New Law of the Sea, 27 
OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 59 (1996). For a more recent listing of resources on 
Marine Scientific Resarch, see TANAKA, supra note 59, at 209 n.1. 
 137. See TANAKA, supra note 59, at 213 (“Article 244 (2) also ensures that 
States, both individually and in co-operation with other States and with competent 
international organisations, shall actively promote the flow of scientific data and 
the transfer of knowledge resulting from marine scientific research, especially to 
developing States.”). 
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As the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 2004138 and the Fourth 
International Polar Year (“IPY”) 2007-2009139 made abundantly 
clear, continuing and expanding scientific investigation of the 
unprecedented changes now occurring in the arctic environment is 
key to understanding the relationship of those changes - both in 
cause and effect - to global change. The Sustaining Arctic Observing 
Networks (“SAON”), endorsed by the Arctic Council, the 
International Arctic Science Committee, the World Meteorological 
Organisation and supported by a much larger initiating group, is just 
one project growing out of the Fourth IPY designed to help achieve 
this end.140 Given that the Russian continental shelf is by far the 
largest in the Arctic Ocean, the absence of participation by Russian 
Federation scientists and limited or no access to that shelf would 
mean significant gaps in data and understanding, weakening the 
usefulness of SAON and, indeed, any scientific undertaking hoping 
to include truly circumpolar data. 
Long before the start of the UNCLOS III negotiations that led to 
the 1982 Convention, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(“USSR”) was a vocal member of the international scientific 
community as it expressed collective concern about growing 
restrictions worldwide on access to continental shelves for research 
purposes.141 Indeed, as early as “January 1967 after earlier discussion 
in the [Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (“IOC”)], the 
 
 138. ACIA SECRETARIAT, ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACTS 
ASSESSMENT (2005), available at http://www.acia.uaf.edu/pages/scientific.html. 
The ACIA was a project of the International Arctic Science Committee and the 
Arctic Council. 
 139. The Fourth International Polar Year (“IPY”), 2007–09 generated 
significant research into the causes and effects of global change in both polar 
regions, and into many other matters relevant to the poles. A history of the IPYs 
(First IPY 1882–83, Second IPY1932–33, and Third IPY, which was called the 
International Geophysical Year 1957–58), is available at http://www.ipy.org (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2010). A representative sampling of IPY projects can be found by 
searching the IPY Publications Database (IPYPD), available at 
http://www.nisc.com/ipy (last visited Jan. 12, 2010). 
 140. See Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks Homepage, http://www.arctic 
observing.org (last visited Jan. 12, 2010). 
 141. See, e.g., WILLIAM T. BURKE, MARINE SCIENCE RESEARCH AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 8, at 9. Stated simplistically, the 
UNCLOS regime for marine scientific research requires a coastal State’s 
permission for scientific activities in its territorial sea and, subject to fewer 
restrictions, in its EEZ and on its continental shelf. 
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USSR took the initiative and proposed that the IOC seek, inter alia, 
to elaborate a general convention embodying principles for 
safeguarding marine science research.”142 Such a convention never 
materialized but that initiative by the USSR represents well not only 
its leadership, but also the international scientific community’s 
engagement in the process that eventually led to Part XIII on Marine 
Scientific Research being included in the 1982 Convention. Eighty 
years earlier, in 1902, Russia was a founding member of the 
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, which in 1964 
produced the first international agreement regarding marine scientific 
research.143  
Recalling these actions by predecessor entities to the Russian 
Federation is a timely reminder of the potential it has today to take a 
leading role in promoting broad access for scientific research 
throughout the Arctic. The importance of the circumpolar North to 
all Arctic states provides incentives to enter into more collaborative 
scientific undertakings in the Arctic Ocean. As the Article 76 process 
is proving, developments in the world of science may well open 
doors for countries to work together on the political level as well. 
  
 
 142. Id. at 9. 
 143. See WEGELEIN, supra note 137, at 24 & nn. 54-55 (noting that Convention 
for the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, Sept. 12, 1964, 652 
U.N.T.S. 237, established the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea 
(“ICES”) in 1902). ICES was originally founded by Russia, Great Britain, the 
Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries. Id. 
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 144. Martin Jakobsson, et al., An improved bathymetric portrayal of the Arctic 
Ocean: Implications for ocean modeling and geological, geophysical and 
oceanographic analyses, 35 GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH LETTERS, L07602, 2008. 
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